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Responses to Salduz: Procedural Tradition, Change
and the Need for Effective Defence
John D. Jackson∗
This article examines the responses of national courts to the ECtHR’s decision in Salduz
v Turkey that suspects be provided with access to a lawyer before they are first interrogated
by the police. It argues that harmonious application of human rights standards in criminal
proceedings should build upon common values underpinning the procedural traditions of
member states. ECtHR success in gaining acceptance for the principle of access to a lawyer
during police interrogation, anchoring it in the privilege against incrimination, is contrasted
with resistance towards giving the defence any active role during criminal investigations. It is
argued that this resistance can be overcome by an appeal to safeguards that have long dominated
the trial process. As the investigation phase increasingly determines the outcome of criminal
proceedings, standards of fairness traditionally reserved for the trial process should be applied
also to this phase in order to provide suspects with an effective defence.
INTRODUCTION
This article aims to explore the response of national courts towards the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)’s decision in Salduz v Turkey1
(Salduz) affirmed soon afterwards in a number of other decisions,2 that
suspects be provided with access to a lawyer before they are first interrogated
by the police. Commentators have remarked upon the rapidly changing
position across Europe in the light of the Salduz decision as a number of
jurisdictions have introduced a clear right to legal assistance at the early stages
of police investigation when they were previously reluctant to do so.3 Within
the ‘inquisitorial’ tradition especially there has long been an attachment
to a model of custodial interrogation which excludes the defence.4 Salduz
∗University of Nottingham. This is a revised version of a paper presented at the EU Criminal Justice
Conference, ‘On the Road to a EU Criminal Justice System: Problems, Achievements and Prospects’
at the University of Limerick, 21-22 May 2015. Thanks are due to Dimitrios Giannoulopoulos,
Ma´ximo Langer, Paul Roberts, Sarah Summers, Thomas Weigend, and the anonymous referees for
comments on earlier drafts. All errors are my own responsibility.
1 (2009) 49 EHRR 421.
2 See, for example, Panovits v Cyprus [2008] 27 BHRC 464, Aslan and Demir v Turkey ECtHR 17
February 2009,Oztu¨rk v Turkey ECtHR 7 February 2009, Aba v Turkey ECtHR 3 March 2009,
Bo¨ke and Kandemir v Turkey ECtHR 10 March 2009, Dayanan v Turkey ECtHR 13 October
2009, Pishchalnikov v Russia ECtHR 24 December 2009, Brusco v France ECtHR 14 October
2010.
3 E. Cape, Z. Namoradze, R. Smith and T. Spronken, Effective Criminal Defence in Europe (Antwerp:
Intersentia, 2010) 584.
4 See J. Hodgson, ‘The Police, the Prosecutor and the Juge d’Instruction: Judicial Supervision
in France, Theory and Practice’ (2001) 41 BJ Crim 342, 359; D. Giannoulopoulos, ‘Custodial
Legal Assistance and Notification of the Right of Silence in France: Legal Cosmopolitanism and
Local Resistance’ (2013) 24 Criminal Law Forum 291.
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can be represented as a triumph of ‘cosmopolitan’ jurisprudence which is
encouraging national courts to engage in a transnational judicial dialogue that
reaches out beyond their domestic legal cultures and traditions.5 But when we
dig a little below the surface, a more confused picture emerges. There may
have been a recognition of the principle of access but there are very different
conceptions about the scope of the right of access and what role lawyers
should in practice play when they obtain access.6 In arguing the need for an EU
Directive to ensure a sufficient and consistent level of compliance with the
Salduz doctrine, the European Commission claimed that the ECtHR rulings
had been interpreted differently by different courts and where courts and
legislatures had attempted to bring procedures into line with the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) they had done so in a piecemeal
fashion that had been reactive rather than proactive.7 The Commission’s
proposal for a Directive was itself, however, subject to an avalanche of criticism
by certain states and led to considerable negotiation with the final agreement
falling short of the original proposal in a number of respects.8 This illustrates
the difficulties in achieving a harmonious application of human rights standards
in criminal proceedings across the member states of the ECHR and the EU.
Looking back on more than six years of practice since the landmark Salduz
ruling, it will be argued that for the ECtHR to be successful in achieving this
aim, it must respond to the ‘quotidian demands of local conditions “on the
ground”’9 by building upon common values so that the changes it wishes to
make are firmly embedded within procedural traditions. The ECtHR’s success
in gaining acceptance for the principle of access to a lawyer during police in-
terrogation can be attributed to the court founding it upon the well-established
privilege against self-incrimination. But whatever the soundness of basing the
principle upon this rationale, the privilege against self-incrimination does not
explain the need for the more active defence role that the court and the EU
institutions would seem to envisage at this stage. For this vision to be truly
realised, it will be suggested that there needs to be an understanding of why
5 For the increasing tendency of judges to engage in transnational dialogue, see G. Canivet,
‘Trans-judicial Dialogue in a Global World’ in S. Muller and S. Richards (eds), Highest Courts
and Globalisation (The Hague: Hague Academic Press, 2010). For examples within criminal
jurisprudence, see P. Roberts, ‘Introduction’ in P. Roberts, Theoretical Foundations of Criminal
Trial Procedure (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014) xxxii.
6 For a recent study, see J. Blackstock, E. Cape, J. Hodgson, A. Ogorodova and T. Spronken, Inside
Police Custody: An Empirical Account of Suspects’ Rights in Four Jurisdictions (Antwerp: Intersentia,
2014).
7 European Commission, Impact Assessment Accompanying the Proposal for a Directive on the Right of
Access to Lawyer 20110, 8 June 2011, SEC (2011) 687 final, para 3.4.2.
8 See Directive 2013/48/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 22 October 2013
on the right of access to a lawyer, OJ 6.11.2013 (L 294). See I. Anagnostopoulos, ‘The Right of
Access to a Lawyer in Europe: A Long Road Ahead?’ (2014) 4 European Criminal Law Review 3;
J. Jackson, ‘Cultural Barriers on the Road to Providing Suspects with Access to a Lawyer’ in R.
Colson and S. Field (eds), EU Criminal Justice and the Challenges of Diversity (Cambridge: CUP,
2016) 181.
9 P. Roberts, ‘Faces of Justice Adrift? Damasˇka’s Comparative Method and the Future of Common
Law Evidence’ in J. Jackson, M. Langer and P. Tillers (eds), Crime, Procedure and Evidence in a
Comparative and International Context: Essays in Honour of Mirjan Damasˇka (Oxford: Hart, 2008)
328.
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what has traditionally been viewed as an investigatory phase of proceedings
is increasingly becoming in effect an adjudicatory phase requiring ‘adversarial’
safeguards reaching beyond the privilege against self-incrimination that are
embedded in the procedural traditions of member states but have traditionally
been reserved for later phases of the criminal process.
We will first examine briefly the two procedural traditions that are
commonly associated with the member states of the Council of Europe and
the European Union and how these came to embrace the principle of defence
participation in criminal proceedings. We will then consider how the ECtHR
has succeeded in gaining acceptance for the principle of access to a lawyer
during police interrogation. Finally, we will illustrate how the application of
this principle has fallen short of the vision of an active defence that the ECtHR
has set out and, it will be argued, needs to be realised as the investigation phase
increasingly determines the outcome of the proceedings.
PROCEDURAL TRADITION AND THE PRINCIPLE OF DEFENCE
PARTICPATION
The view that there are two dominant procedural traditions within Europe
rooted in the separate common law and civil traditions is one that is widely
shared within comparative criminal procedural scholarship, although how ex-
actly these traditions should be characterised and what labels should be given to
them is much more contested.10 It has been argued that the difficulties in reach-
ing agreement as to what the procedural elements of each tradition are or on
what the labels commonly used to describe them – ‘adversarial’, ‘accusatorial’
and ‘inquisitorial’ − actually mean should not deflect us from recognising that
there are two distinct procedural traditions whose importance should not be
under-estimated as we identify common policies and practices being developed
across different systems and as a cosmopolitan law appears to extend beyond the
reach of these traditions.11 In his study of plea bargaining, Langer has argued
that ‘adversarial’ and ‘inquisitorial’ procedural structures of interpretation and
meaning are not only the ‘lenses’ through which legal actors understand and
operate in reality, they also constitute two normative orders that indicate, to
a certain extent, how cases should be handled, what technologies should be
used and how actors of the system should behave.12 His empirical claim that
the adversarial and inquisitorial cultures remain highly predominant in Anglo-
American and civil law jurisdictions of continental Europe and Latin America
10 One of the best analyses of the way both continental and Anglo-American scholarship has tradi-
tionally used expressions such as ‘adversarial’ or ‘accusatorial’ or ‘inquisitorial’ procedure is to be
found in M. R. Damasˇka’s seminal article on comparative criminal justice, ‘Evidentiary Barriers
to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure’ (1973) 121 University of Pennsylvania
Law Review 506, 554-578.
11 S. Field, ‘Fair Trials and Procedural Tradition’ (2009) 29 OJLS 365.
12 M. Langer, ‘From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalisation of Plea Bargaining
and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure’ (2004) 45 Harvard International Law
Journal 1.
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respectively does not preclude the possibility of change within these cultures.
But he tends to view change, as in the introduction of ‘plea bargains’, known as
‘Absprachen’, in Germany which used to be ‘a land without plea bargaining’,13
in terms of a struggle between different interpretations of meaning and different
actors with internal dispositions that correspond to these structures of meaning.
Others see the prospect of change as built into the very notion of the
two procedural traditions. Borrowing from Patrick Glenn’s analysis of legal
tradition,14 Field argues that we should expect ‘adversarial’ and ‘inquisitorial’
traditions to bear only a contingent relationship to actual current practices.15
Traditions are constantly being re-interpreted. This does not mean that the
inquisitorial and adversarial concepts are ‘outdated’; rather they are continually
being reshaped by national and transnational social and legal movements and
they remain important to an analysis of contemporary legal cultures because the
past continues to act upon the present. Like Langer, Field brings change into
the centre of his analysis. Tradition for Field, like culture for Langer, should not
be seen as some kind of unchanging homogeneous ‘life form’. When it comes
to quantifying the impact particular changes have had on procedural tradition,
however, there is a methodological problem of how exactly to do the measure-
ment when the terms used to describe the traditions – adversarial, accusatorial,
inquisitorial − are so contestable while yet exerting such a powerful influence
over the terms of the debate. If the traditions are constantly adapting in clashes
with ‘outside’ forces such as drives for efficiency, accountability, austerity or
human rights, when are we to know whether like the Trojan horse such
forces have succeeded in undermining the tradition or whether tradition has
succeeded in accommodating the change and defeating the enemy at the gate?
One way of answering this question is to consider the extent to which change
undermines the underlying values underpinning the tradition. Unlike cultures
which tend to emphasise difference,16 traditions borrow from each other and
are in constant contact, each containing elements of the other.17 According to
Glenn, this does not mean that ‘in all traditions, all is subject to negotiation’.
He contends that the identity of a tradition is best thought of in ‘triptych
form’.18 The overall identity of a tradition constitutes its total information base
and includes many internal dissenting elements. There is within this a ‘leading’
or ‘primary’ version of the tradition which at any given time appears accepted
as its truest version. But there is also, thirdly, the ‘underlying’ or ‘basic’ element
or elements, ‘those without which no other elements would stand’ and when
there is change to these elements, this would appear to bring the tradition to an
13 ibid, 39, citing, at n 182, J. H. Langbein, ‘Land Without Plea Bargaining: How the Germans
Do It’ (1979) 78 Michigan Law Review 204.
14 H. P. Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World: Sustainable Diversity in Law (Oxford: OUP, 5th ed,
2014).
15 Field, n 11 above.
16 H. P. Glenn, ‘Legal Cultures and Legal Traditions’ in M. Van Hoecke (ed), Epistemology and
Methodology of Comparative Law (Oxford: Hart, 2014) 7, 17. For discussion of ‘culture’ and
‘tradition’ as organising concepts, see W. Twining, General Jurisprudence (Cambridge: CUP,
2009) 79-86.
17 Glenn, n 14 above, 39.
18 ibid.
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end. A particular change may not fundamentally affect the tradition as it can be
adapted, as Glenn has put it, within the overall ‘bran-tub’.19 The blending that
takes place may thus be relatively harmonious. To use another analogy, as cream
is poured into coffee, the coffee may retain its overall coffee-like identity.20 But
the tradition is fundamentally endangered when it accepts something totally
alien or when, over time, the basic tenets of the tradition lose their force or
persuasion and this is likely to occur, according to Glenn, in tandem with the
growth in adherence to another tradition. Sometimes, however, it would seem
that change can affect a tradition profoundly without fundamentally changing
its basic values. Traditions are necessarily connected and bound up with each
other. Some of the basic underlying elements within a procedural tradition are
represented in terms of fundamental values that are shared with other tradi-
tions and the need to preserve or accommodate these may help to explain why
changes may require well-established procedural traditions to re-invent them-
selves in order to remain true to a deeper identity with these values and goals.
The changes that occurred to continental and English criminal procedure
during the nineteenth century which included the use of defence counsel in
both types of trial procedure may be characterised as requiring a re-branding of
the accusatorial and inquisitorial traditions which had been the dominant pro-
cedural traditions in Europe up to this time. The need for change was prompted
by a perception that these traditions were failing to adhere to the key values
of truth finding and due process. Although the traditions had not entirely ne-
glected the need for truth finding and due process, they had become dependent
on practices that were increasingly seen as out of tune with the Enlightenment
thinking of the time.21 At the dawning of the French Revolution both conti-
nental and Anglo-Saxon systems were so clearly lacking in legitimacy by failing
to give expression to these values that change had to be embraced. Many of the
features of the old ‘inquisitorial’ procedural style, such as the system of legal
proofs and the use of torture, became incompatible with the changing political
and social climate and ‘accusatorial’ features began to emerge in a reformed
continental procedure, notably the transmission of the dossier to a public prose-
cutor, who decided whether to bring the case to trial, followed by a public trial
at which both prosecution and defence were given an opportunity for argument
and debate.22 Although Enlightenment thinkers looked across the Channel to-
wards the Anglo-Saxon system for inspiration, this system was also suffering
19 ibid, 41.
20 D.Westbrook, ‘Theorising the Diffusion of Law: Conceptual Difficulties, Unstable Imaginations,
and the Effort to Think Gracefully Nonetheless’ (2006) 47 Harvard International Law Journal 489,
491. It may be unclear at first how new ‘mixes’ will work out, like a baked cake, where the
outcome is not known until the cake is fully baked. At some point, however, it should be possible
to say whether the cake has retained the purity of the individual ingredients that one started out
with – its lemonness, or orangeness etc – or whether the infusion of new ingredients – coffee,
chocolate, or whatever – has changed its overall identity. See E. O¨ru¨cu¨, ‘A General View of
“Legal Families” and of “Mixing Systems”’ in E. O¨ru¨cu¨ and D. Nelken (eds), Comparative Law:
A Handbook (Oxford: Hart, 2007).
21 For the influence of due process on the inquisitorial tradition that emerged from medieval
continental criminal procedure, see M. R. Damasˇka, ‘The Quest for Due Process in the Age of
Inquisition’ (2012) 60 AJCL 919.
22 Damasˇka, n 10 above, 558-559.
C© 2016 The Author. The Modern Law Review C© 2016 The Modern Law Review Limited.
(2016) 79(6) MLR 987–1018 991
Responses to Salduz
from a lack of legitimacy. The lack of any machinery for investigating cases
before trial and the disadvantages defendants suffered by being subjected to
questioning by the judge in a ‘trial by altercation’ without any legal representa-
tionmeant that the system suffered from both truth and fairness deficits.23 Grad-
ually, during the course of the nineteenth century prosecutions came to be over-
seen by either the police, clerks to magistrates or borough solicitors financed out
of public funds and the rise of independent counsel representing the prosecution
at trial led to a corresponding rise in counsel representing the defence, albeit
that a right to legal aid was not introduced until the early twentieth century.24
These changes led scholars to re-characterise the procedural traditions
within continental and English criminal procedure. Scholars on the continent
increasingly referred to their mode of procedure as a ‘mixed’ system consisting
of a mixture of accusatorial and inquisitorial elements while Anglo-American
commentators used the term ‘adversarial’ rather ‘accusatorial’ to highlight the
combative nature of party proceedings which arose from the introduction of
lawyers representing the parties.25 There were differences of emphasis between
continental and Anglo-American scholars in the way in which they charac-
terised the introduction of defence participation into their respective traditions.
Continental jurists saw the change as heralding the development of a new ‘ac-
cusatorial trinity’ whereby the parties were given an opportunity to participate
in trial proceedings and convince the court of their position.26 Ultimately, how-
ever, the criminal proceeding remained a judicial inquiry and this conception
of judicial authority remains influential to this day in continental procedures.
Even in greatly reformed procedures, such as Italy which has given the defence
considerable power to carry out parallel investigations to those of the public
prosecutor, the accusatorial system recoils from the Anglo-American model
of adversary, party domination of the proceedings.27 Anglo-American com-
mentators, on the other hand, emphasised the fact that adversarial procedure
imposes considerable constraints on the judge, limiting the scope for searching
for the truth and being dependent on the material introduced by the parties.28
This meant that the defence role was conceived somewhat differently in each
tradition. The ‘adversarial’ tradition conjures up the notion of a battle with
two opponents attempting to strike each other down, by means of excluding
their evidence so that their opponent has less armoury, then actively presenting
and challenging evidence through the examination and cross-examination
23 See J. Langbein, The Origins of the Adversary Criminal Trial (Oxford: OUP, 2003) 13-16.
24 See Poor Prisoners’ Defence Act 1903. For an account of how legal representation came to be
introduced in English trials during the 19th century, see D. Bentley, English Criminal Justice in the
Nineteenth Century (London: Hambledon, 1998) 125-130.
25 Damasˇka, n 10 above, 558. See also M. R. Damasˇka, ‘Models of Criminal Procedure’ (2001) 51
Zbornik (Collected Papers of Zagreb Law School) 477, 490.
26 S. Summers, Fair Trials: The European Criminal Procedural Tradition and the European Court of
Human Rights (Oxford: Hart, 2007) 24-29.
27 G. Illuminati, ‘The Accusatorial Process from the Italian Point of View’ (2010) 35North Carolina
Journal of International & Commercial Regulation 297.
28 M. Ploskowe, ‘The Development of Present-Day Criminal Procedures in Europe and America’
(1935) 48Harvard Law Review 433; G. Van Kessel, ‘Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal
Trial’ (1992) 67 Notre Dame Law Review 403, 527-531.
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of evidence, with the judge playing an ‘umpireal’ role.29 The mixed
‘inquisitorial/accusatorial’ or, as some have described it, ‘non-adversarial’
tradition,30 on the other hand, embraced a different notion of proofs being
contradicted by the arguments of all participants who play the role of co-pilots
who may go off in different directions but with the judge remaining very
much at the helm.31 The contradictoire principle can accommodate the idea
of certain evidence not being able to be used but such evidence will still be
revealed to the judicial triers of fact who remain charged with examining all
the available evidence.
Although the way in which evidence is to be presented and challenged by
the parties is differently conceived, however, a consensus gradually emerged
within both traditions that defence counsel should represent accused persons
during criminal proceedings and in the twentieth century such a right became
embedded into international human rights law in various human rights
instruments. Built into the wording of Article 6(3)(c) of the ECHR that
defendants can choose to defend themselves or through legal assistance of
their own choosing is the notion that counsel is there at the personal choice
and as the personal representative of the accused, in a protective capacity and
offering an effective mouthpiece for the accused, should he or she choose to
exercise the right of counsel. But it has also been argued that the right provides
the ‘key’ which opens the door to all the rights and possibilities of the defence
in a substantive sense, suggesting that counsel not only acts as a mouthpiece
for the defendant but is there to provide an active defence against the charges
laid.32 This notion of ‘active defence’ appears to straddle both adversarial and
non-adversarial traditions and is reflected in what the ECtHR has described
in numerous decisions as the principles of ‘equality of arms’ and ‘adversarial
procedure’. These principles are respectively defined as giving the parties a
reasonable opportunity to present their case in conditions that do not place
them at substantial disadvantage vis-a`-vis their opponent and giving them an
opportunity to have knowledge and comment on the observations filed and
the evidence adduced by the other party.33
ACCESS TO A LAWYER DURING POLICE INVESTIGATION BEFORE
SALDUZ
If a consensus emerged across the traditions that defendants were entitled to an
‘active defence’ during the criminal trial proceedings in order to engage fully in
29 A. Ryan, Towards a System of European Criminal Justice (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014) 81.
30 See, for example, Damasˇka, n 10 above.
31 See also Grande’s use of different dance styles – the ‘tango’ and the ‘rumba’ − to characterise
the two procedural forms: E. Grande, ‘Dances of Criminal Justice: Thoughts on Systemic
Differences and the Search for Truth’ in Jackson et al, n 9 above, 145.
32 S. Trechsel, Human Rights and Criminal Proceedings (Oxford: OUP, 2005) 245. The way in which
the role of defence counsel is conceived has implications for whether an ‘absent’ accused is
entitled to legal assistance: see Naziraj v Germany ECtHR 8 Nov 2012.
33 J. D. Jackson, ‘The Effect of Human Rights on Criminal Evidentiary Processes: Towards Con-
vergence, Divergence or Realignment?’ (2005) 68 MLR 737.
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‘adversarial’ argument, there was no such acceptance in either tradition that sus-
pects should be entitled to any active defence during the investigatory phase of
the proceedings. As accused persons became increasingly subject to questioning
during this phase, certain nineteenth century scholars argued that ‘accusatorial’
features should be introduced in this phase as well as at trial. But legislators and
judges rejected such an idea on the ground that this would compromise the
effectiveness of the investigation.34 At common law, those committed for trial
could hire lawyers to prepare for trial if prison rules allowed access. But there
was no recognition of any right to legal assistance during the preliminary inves-
tigation conducted by magistrates in the early part of the 19th century, although
this changed when magistrates ceased to exercise investigative functions under
Jervis’s Indictable Offences Act 1848.35 In France the law of 1897 extended
the right to be assisted by a lawyer to the pre-trial phase where interrogations
were conducted by the juge d’instruction. Lawyers could be present during the
interrogation but the object of the lawyer’s presence was to exercise control over
any abuse of process by the juge rather than to engage in any debate with the
judge.36 In Germany and Italy the role of the lawyer was even more restricted
during the instruction phase. Defendants could be advised by lawyers but
lawyers could not be present when they were questioned.37 Gradually, the role
of the defence expanded to incorporate the principle of contradictoire into the
instruction phase.38 But there was no acceptance in either tradition that lawyers
could be present during any questioning by the police who were increasingly
given an important role in criminal investigation across the traditions.39
Instead what was important at the pre-trial investigation phase was that any
participation by suspects should be voluntary and of their own free will. The
voluntariness principle, whereby any statements induced by promises or threats
held out by persons in authority could not be admitted as evidence, became well
established in common law jurisdictions throughout the nineteenth century.40
Other jurisdictions across the traditions prohibited the use or threat of force or
violence and other forms of coercion against suspects in custody and excluded
confessions so obtained.41 Gradually, this led to a recognition of the right of
34 Summers, n 26 above, 83.
35 See Bentley, n 24 above, 31-32, 40-41, Summers, ibid, 87 citing Cox v Coleridge (1822) 1 B &
C 37, 54-55. In Scotland, the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1887, s 17 recognised a right
to consult a law agent who could be present during judicial examination. See F. Leverick, ‘The
Right to Legal Assistance during Detention’ (2011) 15 Edinburgh Law Review 353.
36 See M. Ploskowe, ‘The Investigating Magistrate (Juge d’Instruction) in European Criminal
Procedure’ (1935) 33 Michigan Law Review 1010, 1015.
37 ibid, 1016.
38 This did not happen everywhere however. For example, in Belgium defence counsel had no right
to be present when the accused was questioned or witnesses were examined. See C. Van Den
Wyngaert (ed), Criminal Procedure Systems in the European Community (London: Butterworths,
1993) 16.
39 See E. A. Tomlinson, ‘Nonadversarial Justice: The French Experience’ (1983) 42 Maryland Law
Review 131, 167, arguing that the ‘rights of the defence’ do not apply at all during the earlier
stage of a police inquiry and stating that it is contrary to the ethics of French lawyers to have
any contact with the judicial police on behalf of a client during the course of a police inquiry.
40 The rule dates back to R v Warickshall (1783) 1 Leach 263. For a survey of the history of this
rule, see P. Mirfield, Confessions (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1985) 42.
41 For a survey of the law, see C. M. Bradley, ‘The Emerging Consensus as to Criminal Procedure
Rules’ (1993) 14Michigan Journal of International Law 171; G. Van Kessel, ‘European Perspectives
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silence and a right for suspects to be informed of such a right, although there
were variations in the way this right was communicated to suspects. From 1848
in England and Wales magistrates were additionally required to warn suspects
prior to taking a statement from them that whatever they said may be given
against them at their trial, which appeared to be a stronger reinforcement of
the right to silence than merely telling suspects that they may remain silent.42
When the police took over criminal investigations from magistrates, they were
at first prohibited from questioning suspects but were later permitted to do
so under Judges’ Rules, provided cautions were issued warning suspects that
they did not have to answer questions.43 Although the right of silence is of
more recent vintage on the continent as it jarred with the traditional view that
suspects were expected to participate in the investigatory phase of inquisitorial
procedure,44 gradually throughout the 20th century it became accepted as a key
protection for suspects who were detained in custody, so that by the end of the
century many, although not all, jurisdictions provided that an accused be told
of the right to remain silent both during pre-trial questioning and at trial.45
By the 1990s the ECtHR came to rule on its importance by stating in a
number of decisions that the privilege against self-incrimination and the right
to silence are ‘generally recognised international standards which lie at the
heart of the notion of a fair procedure under art 6’.46 Taking its cue from
the emphasis placed in national jurisdictions on the need for any accused’s
participation in the criminal process to be voluntary, the court considered that
one of the rationales of the privilege was for the prosecution in a criminal
case to seek to prove their case against the accused without resort to evidence
obtained through methods of coercion and oppression in defiance of the will
of the accused. Such a right exists from the moment a person is ‘charged’ with
on the Accused as a Source of Testimonial Evidence’ (1998) 100 West Virginia Law Review 799,
804-805.
42 Summers, n 26 above, 85.
43 For a history of the Judges’ Rules and the Administrative Directions that accompanied them, see
Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, Law and Procedure Cmnd 8092-1 (1981), Appendix
13.
44 Damasˇka, n 10 above, 527, Van Kessel, n 28, above 842.
45 See, for example, Germany Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP), Art 136.1; Italy CCP, Art
64.3; Spain CCP, Art 520.2a. See generally Giannoulopoulos, n 4 above, 303-306. In France
notification of the right of silence was not required until 2000 but this was replaced in 2002
by a law which informed the suspect only of a number of options including a right of silence
and the following year the obligation was removed altogether until 2011. See J. Hodgson,
French Criminal Justice (Oxford: Hart, 2005) 12; Giannoulopoulos, ibid, 300-302. In Belgium
the right of notification was only introduced in 2011 under the Law of 13 August 2011, Art
2. See Giannoulopoulos, ibid, 305. Although the CCP of 1926 in The Netherlands required
that suspects be warned of their right of silence, this requirement was abolished in 1934 and the
caution was only reinstated in 1974. See C. Brants, ‘The Reluctant Dutch Response to Salduz’
(2011) Edinburgh Law Review 298. There were also differences between jurisdictions as to the
scope of these requirements. See Van Kessel, n 41 above, 808, making the point that in Germany
and England warnings must be given to suspects who are being investigated, not necessarily in
custody, and in Italy even those who are not under arrest or investigation must be cautioned as
soon as they begin to make inculpatory statements.
46 Funke v France (1993) 16 EHRR 297at [41]-[44], Saunders v United Kingdom (1997) 23 EHRR
313 at [68], John Murray v United Kingdom (1996) 22 EHRR 29 at [45], Heaney and McGuinness
v Ireland (2001) 33 EHRR 12 at [40], Getiren v Turkey ECtHR 22 July 2008 at [123].
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a criminal offence, which has been interpreted to mean when the person is
formally charged with an offence or has otherwise been notified that he or she
is suspected of an offence.47 Interestingly, however, it took some time before
the court came to affirm the need for suspects to be informed of their right
of silence before being questioned by the police.48
While the right of silence has gradually become a well-established principle
across the procedural traditions and is now reinforced by international human
rights jurisprudence,49 there was greater reluctance across the procedural
traditions to accede to any right of access to a lawyer at the stage of police
questioning. However, from the mid-twentieth century there were gradual
signs of such a right becoming recognised primarily as a means of giving
recognition to the right of silence. Within the adversarial tradition the right
of access at the stage of police questioning became famously associated with
the privilege against self-incrimination when the United States Supreme
Court (USSCt) required in Miranda v Arizona50 (Miranda) that prior to any
questioning suspects had to be warned not only of their right to silence but of
their right to the presence of an attorney. The USSCt affirmed that the Fifth
Amendment privilege was available outside of criminal court proceedings and
served to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is cur-
tailed in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves.51
The court concluded that without proper safeguards the process of in-custody
interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contained inherently
compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist
and compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely. The
court did not want to be over-prescriptive about the various ways in which the
privilege could be protected but it considered that a number of safeguards had
to be observed: notification of the right of silence; an explanation that anything
said can and will be used against the individual in court; and, crucially, mindful
of the fact that the circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can
operate to overbear the will of one merely made aware of the privilege, the
right to have counsel present at the interrogation; notification of the right to
consult a lawyer and to have him or her present during interrogation; and the
right of indigent persons to have a lawyer appointed to represent him.52 The
right of access was deliberately framed in terms of the need for the lawyer to be
47 Deweer v Belgium (1979-80) 2 EHRR 439 at [46], Pederson and Baadsgaard v Denmark ECtHR
17 Dec 2004.
48 Zaichenko v Russia ECtHR 18 Feb 2010 at [52]. Trechsel considers that the absence of applicants’
claims based on the need for a caution explains the lack of case law on the point. In order to
be successful on the basis of such a claim the applicant would have to claim that he or she was
mainly convicted on the basis of statements made as a result of waiving the right to remain silent,
such waiver not being valid because he or she was not properly informed of the right to remain
silent. See n 32 above, 352.
49 Although the ECHR does not give express recognition to the privilege against self-
incrimination, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art 14 (3)(g) states
that everyone shall be entitled not to be compelled to be a witness against himself or to plead
guilty.
50 (1965) 384 US 436.
51 ibid, 467.
52 ibid, 467-473.
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present during questioning because ‘the need for the lawyer to protect the Fifth
Amendment in the environment of a secret interrogation process comprehends
not merely a right to consult with counsel prior to questioning, but also to
have counsel present during any questioning if the defendant so desires’.53
What comes across unmistakeably from the judgment is the manner in
which justification for the presence of a lawyer is instrumentally tied to the
privilege and the need to protect the suspect from speaking when he would
not otherwise do so freely. Crucially, the presence of a lawyer is limited to
situations where the suspect is going to be interrogated and there is no right of
access unless there is going to be an interrogation.54 The court did accept that
the lawyer’s presence at the interrogation may serve other subsidiary functions
as well: mitigation of the dangers of untrustworthiness if the accused decides
to talk, reduction of coercion, and the need for any statement made to the
police to be accurate and for it to be accurately reported by the prosecution
at trial.55 These functions are primarily about protecting the accused from
the dangers of his or her participation in the interrogation and there was no
attempt to assimilate counsel’s role here with the kind of active defence role
that lawyers are expected to play at trial. This point was illustrated, if only
indirectly, when the court went on to hold that just as at trial there is no need
for an accused to make a request for a lawyer, so an individual need not make
a pre-interrogation request for a lawyer, adding that: ‘Although the role of
counsel at trial differs from the role during interrogation, the differences are
not relevant to the question whether a request is a prerequisite’.56
The USSCt interestingly sought to justify its position by making reference to
similar changes that were taking place within the common law tradition. It pro-
claimed that the 1964 version of the English Judges’ Rules expressly recognised
the right of an individual to consult with an attorney while under questioning
by the police.57 In fact such a principle was highly qualified and it stopped short
of any right for a solicitor to be present when a person in custody is being ques-
tioned.58 It was not until the Police and Criminal Evidence Act was enacted
in 1984 that there was any meaningful recognition in England and Wales of a
suspect’s right to consult a solicitor at any time on request while in detention.59
This legislation was enacted against the background of the recommendations
of a Royal Commission which had been tasked to find an appropriate balance
between the interests of the community in bringing offenders to justice and
53 ibid, 470.
54 See Van Kessel, n 41 above, 837 citing Duckworth v Eagan (1989) 492 US 195, which held that
Miranda does not require that lawyers be producible on call, but only that a suspect be informed
that he has a right to counsel before and during questioning.
55 n 50 above, 470.
56 ibid, 471.
57 ibid, 488.
58 Principle (c) of the Judges’ Rules stated that ‘every person at any stage of an investigation should
be able to communicate and to consult privately with a solicitor’ even if in custody provided
that ‘in such a case no unreasonable delay or hindrance is caused to the processes of investigation
or the administration of justice by his doing so’.
59 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), s 58 states that ‘a person arrested and held in
custody in a police station . . . shall be entitled if he so requests, to consult a solicitor privately
at any time’.
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the rights and liberties of persons accused or suspected of crime.60 Such a
wide-ranging review of criminal procedure had in turn been prompted by
an inquiry that had pointed to a miscarriage of justice in the case of three
youths who had confessed to crimes which they had not committed in
police custody in the absence of legal advice.61 The Royal Commission gave
particular attention to the importance of the right to legal assistance as a means
of providing the suspect with advice on the legal intricacies of her situation,
which included but was not limited to advising on the full implications or the
desirability of exercising her right of silence. For this reason it considered that
the power to refuse access should be exercised only in exceptional cases and
should not be refused because a solicitor may advise his client not to speak.62
The Commission also considered that the practice of having a solicitor present
at interview should be encouraged but it emphasised that he should have no
wider formal function than to offer the suspect advice if requested.63
Developments in Scotland took a different turn. There, too, the police had
resorted to questioning suspects before arrest and charge but doubts about
the legal basis for holding suspects for questioning before they were arrested
and brought before a sheriff for judicial examination persuaded the Thomson
Committee in 1975 to recommend that the police be given a six hour period
to detain a person for questioning where there were grounds for suspecting
he had committed an offence punishable by imprisonment.64 The police were
required to caution the suspect that he need not answer any questions but
under section 3 of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980 there was no right
for the suspect to consult a lawyer before being questioned during this period,
although the suspect was entitled to have intimation of his detention sent to
a solicitor without unnecessary delay.
In Ireland Custody Regulations under the Criminal Justice Act 1984 re-
quired that all persons arrested and held in Garda custody were informed of their
entitlement to consult a solicitor.65 Although the Irish courts adverted to the
existence of a right of access to pre-trial legal advice in a number of cases dating
back to the 1970s, the right did not gain constitutional status until 1990 when
the Supreme Court gave constitutional recognition to the right of ‘reasonable
access’ to a solicitor.66 The court did not specify the particular constitutional
60 See Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, Report Cmnd 8092 (1981).
61 See Report of the Inquiry by the Hon Sir Henry Fisher into the Circumstances Leading to the Trial of
Three Persons on Charges Arising out of the Death of Maxwell Confait and the Fire at 27 Doggett Road
SE6 HC 90 (1977). The report considered that the then Judges’ Rules should be amended to
permit a solicitor to attend the interrogation if this is requested and the interrogation should be
delayed until the solicitor arrives (ibid, para 2.22).
62 n 60 above, paras 4.89- 4.90.
63 ibid, para 4.88.
64 Thomson Committee, Criminal Procedure in Scotland (Second Report) Cmnd 6218 (1975). The
history to the background of the Thomson Committee’s recommendations is recounted by
Lord Rodger in his judgment in Cadder v HM Advocate [2010] 1 WLR 2601 at [74]-[86]. See
Leverick, n 35 above; P. Duff, ‘Chalmers to Cadder: Full Circle to Police Interrogation?’ (2015)
19 Edinburgh Law Review 186.
65 Criminal Justice Act 1984 (Treatment of Persons in Custody in Garda Sı´ocha´na Stations) Reg-
ulations 1987, reg 8.
66 DPP v Healy [1990] ILRM 313.
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provision relied upon, however it appeared to recognise a two-fold raison d’eˆtre
for the right: to inform the suspect of all his rights, including his right to silence,
so that any decision to make a statement is freely reached and therefore volun-
tary and to redress the imbalance between the power and position of the suspect
and that of the gardaı´.67 A number of questions were left unanswered by the
decision, not least what exactly was meant by ‘reasonable’ access. Clearly, how-
ever, the role of the solicitor was confined to one of giving advice and support
and did not extend to the kind of active defence role required of counsel at trial.
In continental Europe there was a stronger cultural resistance to the notion
that access to a lawyer was necessary to protect the suspect from any abuse or
coercion during police questioning. The inquisitorial ideal presupposed that
all questioning should be under the supervision of the investigating magistrate
or prosecutors whose independent judicial status guaranteed due process.68
However, there were signs in the late twentieth century of some recognition of
a right of access to a lawyer at some stage during police detention before trial,
albeit the right was qualified and restricted in a number of jurisdictions. The
criminal procedure codes in jurisdictions such as Germany, Spain and Italy
aligned the right to be informed of the right of silence with the right to consult
with a lawyer before interrogation.69 But other jurisdictions took a much
more restrictive approach. In Belgium the lawyer only had a right of access
after interrogation by the investigating judge.70 In The Netherlands access to
a lawyer under the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1926 was qualified where
in the opinion of the judge of instruction or prosecutor the interests of the
investigation made the exercise of the right undesirable.71 In France suspects
first obtained the right to request a meeting with a lawyer, lasting a maximum
of 30 minutes, from the beginning of the garde a` vue in 1993. But the exact
point at which access should be granted and for how long became matters of
much controversy in succeeding years. The law was repeatedly changed in the
years leading up to the Salduz decision as successive governments of different
political hues engaged in a game of ‘political ping pong’.72
67 V. Conway, Y. Daly and J. Schweppe, Irish Criminal Justice: Theory, Process and Procedure (Dublin:
Clarus, 2010) 53.
68 Hodgson, n 4 above, 347. Van Kessel reported in 1998 that ‘there is no general understanding
on the continent that a right to counsel during initial questioning of suspects by the police is a
necessary aspect of a fair criminal process’, n 28 above, 810.
69 In Germany CCP, Art 163a(4) requires the police to inform suspects of their right to a lawyer
before questioning. See also Spain CCP, Art 520 which permits the lawyer to be present during
the interrogations. In Italy, under the reformed CPP of 1989, questioning of a suspect by the
police cannot be conducted in the absence of a lawyer. In Germany the fact that the Code does
not expressly grant the defence lawyer a right to be present has been interpreted as a denial of
a right of attendance. See T. Weigend and F. Salditt, ‘The Investigative Stage of the Criminal
Process in Germany’ in E. Cape, J. Hodgson, T. Prakken and T. Spronken (eds), Suspects in
Europe (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2007) 79, 90.
70 J. Fermon, F. Verbruggen and A. De Decker, ‘The Investigative Stage of the Criminal Process
in Belgium’ in Cape et al, ibid 29, 47.
71 Brants, n 45 above.
72 Giannoulopoulos, n 4 above, 299. See J. Hodgson, ‘Constructing the Pre-trial Role of the
Defence in French Criminal Procedure: French Criminal Justice’ (2002) 6 IJEP 1, 39, S. Field
and A. West, ‘Dialogue and the Inquisitorial Tradition: French Defence Lawyers in the Pre-Trial
Criminal Process’ (2003) 14 Criminal Law Forum 261. Prior to Salduz suspects were limited to
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Even when access to a lawyer was granted in the continental procedures,
the role of the lawyer was largely restricted to one of advising suspects of their
rights, including the right of silence and did not extend to an active defence
role of intervening in the interrogation and generally challenging evidence.73 It
is true that some of the reforms in France to increase access to defence counsel
did spark debates which contested this limited conception of the defence role.74
But the dominant view of prosecutors and judges was that defence participation
would interfere with effective investigation.75 Reforms in Spain arising from
the requirement in the new Spanish Constitution of 1978 that arrested persons
shall be guaranteed the assistance of a lawyer during police inquiries and
judicial proceedings led to a debate about exactly what role lawyers should
play in the police station.76 There were calls for lawyers to be able to intervene
actively in all legal processes on behalf of the arrested person including during
the interrogation of the accused. In the event, however, the role of the lawyer
was limited to one of advising arrested persons of their rights and fell short of
any active participation during the interrogation of the accused.77
SALDUZ AND THE PRINCIPLE OF ACCESS TO A LAWYER
It is against this background that the ECtHR issued its landmark decision in
Salduz in 2008. Up to this point the ECtHR had followed many national
jurisdictions by heavily qualifying the right of access to a lawyer, restricting it
to certain circumstances and stating that it was subject to denial for good cause.
In John Murray v United Kingdom78 the Court said that Article 6 will normally
require that the accused be allowed to benefit from the assistance of a lawyer
where national laws may attach consequences to the attitude of an accused at
the initial stages of police interrogation which are decisive for the prospects of
the defence in subsequent proceedings. The particular consequences in Murray
related to the difficulties that arose from legislation permitting inferences to
be drawn from an accused’s silence and the need to be advised on whether
to speak to the police. In Salduz79 the Court went much further by ruling
that access to a lawyer should be provided as a rule from the first interrogation
30 minute meetings at the beginning of detention and then on each extension of detention
which meant two 30 minute meetings within 48 hours of interrogation.
73 A. Dorange and S. Field, ‘Reforming Defence Rights in French Police Custody: a coming
together in Europe?’ (2012) 16 IJEP 153, 156. cf, however, Germany where it appears that
when defence counsel are present during the police questioning of a suspect, they may ask
questions and make statements (personal correspondence with Thomas Weigend, 24 September
2015).
74 ibid.
75 For the view of prosecutors in France see Hodgson, n 4 above, 355-356.
76 H. W. McGee, ‘Counsel for the Accused: Metamorphosis in Spanish Constitutional Rights’
(1987) 25 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 253, 278-279.
77 See CCP, Art 520.6. The government view was that the primary concern was to erase the spectre
of physical abuse and to ensure that the defendant would not involuntarily answer questions. See
McGee, ibid, 279-280.
78 (1996) 22 EHRR 29.
79 n 1 above at [55].
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of a suspect by the police unless it is demonstrated that there are compelling
reasons to restrict this right. This may be described as the Salduz principle. In
line with the recognition in certain national jurisdictions across the procedural
traditions that a primary justification for access was to protect the accused’s
right of silence, reference was made to the particularly vulnerable position
that the accused finds himself in at the investigation stage of the proceeding
which in the majority of cases could only be compensated by the presence of
lawyers. The right was expressly linked with the importance of preserving the
privilege against self-incrimination when the court said that
early access to a lawyer is part of the procedural safeguards to which the Court
will have particular regard when examining whether a procedure has extinguished
the very essence of the privilege against self-incrimination.80
Although, as we shall see, the Court also adverted in its justification of the right
to early access to a lawyer to other grounds than simply protecting the suspect
from self-incrimination, it was the protective role that lawyers could play at this
stage that was emphasised in national court decisions following the Salduz deci-
sion. Thus as Giannoulopoulos has illustrated in his article on custodial legal as-
sistance in France,81 theConseil constitutionnel and then theCour de cassation took
inspiration directly from Salduz. In the case before the Conseil constitutionnel82
the applicants highlighted the fact that under the existing legislation a person
remanded in custody was entitled to speak with a lawyer for only 30 minutes,
the lawyer involved had no access to the contents of the police file and could not
be present during questioning and the person remanded in custody was not in-
formed of his right to remain silent. In these circumstances it was argued that re-
manding a person in custody for police questioning failed to respect the rights of
the defence. The court took the exceptional step of striking down the constitu-
tionality of Article 63–4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the ground that
it failed to allow a detainee to have the benefit of effective assistance of a lawyer
while undergoing questioning and it failed to require the suspect to be informed
of his right of silence. The court made an express link between the right to
assistance and the right to silence, thus emphasising, as Salduz had done, the
important protective role that lawyers can play.83 It chose not to refer, however,
to the failure to acquaint the lawyer with the contents of the police file which
would give the lawyer a basis on which to challenge the evidence against the
accused. By the time of the later decisions of the Cour de cassation, the ECtHR
had applied the Salduz ruling specifically against France in Brusco v France.84
The Cour de Cassation drew directly upon Salduz by holding that the require-
ments of Article 6 of the ECHR required that a suspect must not be questioned
in the absence of his lawyer and that he must be informed of the right of silence
and be assisted by a lawyer from the beginning of the garde a` vue.85
80 ibid at [54].
81 Giannoulopoulos, n 4 above.
82 Conseil constitutionnel, 30 juillet 2010, no.2010-14/22 QPC.
83 ibid at [28].
84 n 2 above.
85 Crim 19 Octobre 2010, Bull crim 163, 164, 165.
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The link between the right of silence, the privilege against self-incrimination
and access to a lawyer was even more pronounced in the decision of the United
Kingdom Supreme Court (UKSCt) in Cadder v HM Advocate86 (Cadder) to
endorse Salduz rather than the approach of the Scottish courts, rejecting the
Scottish system permitting the police to question suspects for six hours without
allowing them access to a lawyer as unlawful. The High Court of Justiciary in
HM Advocate vMcLean87 had taken the view that it was unnecessary to provide
access to a lawyer to a detainee if he or she were given sufficient other safeguards
to secure a fair trial. The court stressed that the limited six hour apprehension
on suspicion before charge to which the name ‘detention’ was given was subject
to a number of safeguards, including a caution that the suspect need not answer
questions; the tape recording of the subsequent interview; the inadmissibility
of any statements obtained through coercion or other unfair means; a require-
ment that no adverse inferences may be drawn from silence; a requirement for
any admission to be corroborated by independent evidence; and finally the fact
that the detention may last for only six hours.88 To the Justices of the Supreme
Court, however, these safeguards were ‘beside the point’ as the ECtHR had
derived the suspect’s right to legal advice specifically from the right against
self-incrimination.89 Since, as Lord Rodger pointed out, this implied right was
based on the need to protect the right of the person concerned not to incrimi-
nate himself, the only safeguards in Scots domestic law which could be relevant
would be those designed to protect that right and the safeguards mentioned in
HMAdvocate vMcClean although ‘admirable’ did not make up for the lack of any
right for the suspect to take legal advice before being questioned as to whether
he should say anything at all and, if so, how far he should go.90 The limited de-
tention period allowed for questioning in the absence of legal advice was there-
fore the very converse of what the Grand Chamber had held was required by
Article 6, namely a right of access to a lawyer before any questioning of a suspect
has taken place in order to protect the suspect’s right against self-incrimination.
The UKSCt accepted that the Grand Chamber judgment referred to
other rationales for the right of access to a lawyer. Lord Hope referred
to the reference in the judgment to the numerous recommendations by
the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment which underlined the point that the
right of any detainee to have access to legal advice is a fundamental safeguard
against ill-treatment.91 In his Lordship’s view, there was perhaps an indication
here that the primary concern of the Grand Chamber was to eliminate the
risk of ill-treatment or other forms of physical or psychological pressure as a
means of coercing the detainee to incriminate himself. If this was the primary
concern of the Grand Chamber then the use of techniques that were already
evident in Scots law, such as the tape-recording of interviews, would meet
86 [2010] 1 WLR 2601.
87 [2009] HCJAC 97.
88 ibid at [27].
89 n 86 above at [66], [73] per Lord Rodger.
90 ibid at [92].
91 ibid at [33].
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the need to monitor fairness.92 But Lord Hope considered that the way the
Grand Chamber went on to express itself, and in particular its statement at
the end of paragraph 55 that the rights of the defence will be irretrievably
prejudiced when incriminating statements made during police interrogation
without access to a lawyer are used for a conviction, showed that the emphasis
throughout the Salduz judgment was on the presence of a lawyer as necessary to
ensure respect for the right of the detainee not to incriminate himself.93 Later
he pointed to the suggestion of the High Court of Justiciary that the Grand
Chamber was particularly influenced by the ECtHR case of Jalloh v Germany94
where in contrast to the present case, a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR was
also in issue. Lord Hope considered that the ECtHR plainly had in mind that:
there was a consensus across Europe that the presence of a lawyer was a safeguard
against ill-treatment . . . But it is just as plain that the risk of irretrievable prejudice
to the accused because of a lack of respect of his right to remain silent was at the
forefront of its mind too.95
The link between the right to legal advice and the privilege against self-
incrimination was also very evident in the reasoning of the Irish Supreme Court
ruling inDPP vGormley; DPP vWhite96 that a suspect has a right to early access
to a lawyer after arrest and a right not to be interrogated without having had
an opportunity to obtain legal advice. The Supreme Court went far beyond
Strasbourg, taking in the jurisprudence of the supreme courts of the US,
Canada, Australia and New Zealand, before reaching its conclusion that there
was a ‘clear international view to the effect that there is, at a minimum, an
obligation in most circumstances (possibly subject to some exceptions) on inves-
tigating police to refrain from interrogating a suspect at a time after the suspect
has requested a lawyer and before that lawyer has arrived to advise the suspect
concerned’.97 The court firmly grounded the right of access in the Irish consti-
tutional entitlement to ‘a trial in due course of law’ stressing that once a suspect
has been arrested and can be subjected to mandatory questioning, it is proper
to regard the process as intimately linked with a criminal trial rather than being
one at a purely investigative stage and that basic fairness of process must apply.98
This was the approach that the ECtHR and the USSCt had accepted. In an in-
teresting comment on the difference between what fairness might entail before
the trial as opposed to at trial, the court said that it did not follow that all of the
rights which someone may have at trial apply at each stage of the process leading
up to trial. However, the fundamental requirement of fairness applied from the
time of arrest of a suspect so that any breach of that requirement can lead to an
absence of a trial in due course of law.99 The court emphasised that the reasoning
92 ibid at [34]-[35].
93 ibid.
94 Jalloh v Germany (2006) 44 EHRR 32.
95 n 86 above at [44].
96 [2014] IESC 17.
97 ibid at [7.11].
98 ibid at [8.8].
99 ibid.
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behind the obligation to ensure legal advice before questioning was to be found
in the jurisprudence of courts whose judgments the Irish courts frequently re-
garded as persuasive. It referred in particular to Warren CJ’s suggestion in
Miranda as far back as 1966 that the right to have a lawyer present at the
interrogation is indispensable to the protection of the privilege against self-
incrimination, a proposition that applied equally to advice prior to interroga-
tion. The court stressed that both the ECtHR in Salduz and the USSCt in
Miranda had accepted that the entitlement not to self-incriminate incorporates
an entitlement to legal advice in advance of mandatory questioning of a suspect
in custody.100
It is interesting here that the Irish Supreme Court drew support for the
principle of the right of access not only from the Salduz decision but also from
the supreme courts of common law countries demonstrating the importance
of considering the reasoning of courts with a similar procedural tradition. It
has been pointed out that the Supreme Court’s willingness to examine the
jurisprudence of other common law courts is an excellent example of legal
cosmopolitanism but it is cosmopolitanism from the angle of the common
law.101 In this respect it falls short of the kind of cosmopolitan jurisprudence
practised by the ECtHR which is directed at member states across the full
spectrum of adversarial and inquisitorial traditions. There was no reference to
simultaneous European attempts to apply the very same jurisprudence emanat-
ing from Strasbourg, nor any reference to the EU Directive to which Ireland
had through its Presidency of the European Council secured agreement with
the European Parliament, although it did not in fact opt into the Directive.
In the light of Salduz, then, courts in a number of countries came to accept
the principle of a right of access to a lawyer when suspects are first questioned
by the police but they did so in some instances after being assured that such
a right was consistent with or even mandated by principles that had come
to be accepted within their procedural tradition such as the privilege against
self-incrimination. This is not to say that the principle of access to a lawyer
before questioning would have been accepted without Salduz. Prior to Salduz,
Belgium, France, Scotland, The Netherlands and Ireland had not recognised
the principle. Since then, following decisions of their national courts, they
have all introduced the right in some shape or form – in some cases by
legislation; in other cases by prosecutorial decree.102 However, it does suggest
100 ibid at [9.13].
101 D. Giannoulopoulos, ‘Strasbourg Jurisprudence, Law Reform and Comparative Law: A Tale of
the Right to Custodial Legal Assistance in Five Countries’ (2016) 16 HRLR 103.
102 Emergency legislation was introduced in Scotland to provide suspects with a right to legal
advice before police questioning under the Criminal Procedure (Legal Assistance, Detention
and Appeals)(Scotland) Act 2010. Legislation was introduced in France on 14 April 2011 and
in Belgium on 13 August 2011. In The Netherlands and Ireland binding instructions have been
issued by the prosecution service to give effect to the rule. See Brants, n 45 above, 302-303 and
Y. Daly and J. Jackson, ‘The Criminal Justice Process: from Questioning to Trial’ in D. Healy,
C. Hamilton, Y. Daly and M. Butler (eds), Routledge Handbook of Irish Criminology (Abingdon:
Routledge, 2016) 292. See now Garda Code of Practice on Access to a Solicitor by Persons in
Police Custody April 2015 at http://garda.ie/Documents/User/Code%20of%20Practice%
20on%20Access%20to%20a%20Solicitor%20by%20Persons%20in%20Garda%20Custody.pdf
(last accessed 29 July 2016).
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that unless Strasbourg – and by implication the other European institutions as
well – can put forward a rationale for a procedural right which can be justified
as coming within a broad domestic procedural tradition, it may not be able to
secure the endorsement of member states for it. The lesson here for European
institutions is that in trying to command consensus on procedural rights, they
must be able to communicate with the procedural traditions of member states
as these traditions can be influential in determining whether the rights will be
accepted. It is not enough for the court to provide a rationale purely in terms
of ‘Strasbourg’ jurisprudence, what has been described as a ‘court-centred’
explanation of acceptance of ECtHR jurisprudence.103 ‘Court-centred’
explanations have to be considered together with ‘member state-centred’
explanations that offer an account of acceptance in terms of indigenous
traditions and other forces shaping national responses. This can be illustrated
further when we look beyond the principle of the right of access at how the
right has been applied in the member states and in particular at the kind of
role that lawyers are permitted to play when they have been granted access.
DEFENCE ROLES DURING POLICE INVESTIGATION
Although Salduz firmly established the principle of early access to a lawyer,
it said little about what kind of access was required and what kind of legal
assistance should be given to suspects once access is granted. We have seen that
Salduz grounded the right to early access to a lawyer primarily in the privilege
against self-incrimination but this still leaves considerable scope for argument
as to what kind of access this entails. One of the difficulties lies in determining
what exactly the privilege against self-incrimination is designed to achieve.
Although the privilege is a widely accepted principle, scholars have struggled
to find a convincing rationale that justifies it as a self-standing right that should
exist over and above the absolute right not to be subjected to torture, inhuman
or degrading treatment and the more qualified, general right to privacy that
all persons, not just suspects, are entitled to.104 When construed narrowly
as a right not to be compelled to make a confession, the right seems barely
distinguishable from a right not to be subjected to physical or psychological
ill-treatment. On this view, access to a lawyer is only necessary to guard
against foul play and it has been pointed out that other safeguards such as those
mentioned in HM Advocate v McLean are just as efficacious in doing this.105
When the privilege is associated more broadly with respecting the will of the
103 Giannoulopoulos, n 101 above. cf J. Jackson and S. Summers, ‘Confrontation with Strasbourg:
UK and Swiss Approaches to Criminal Evidence’ [2013] Crim LR 114.
104 See the discussion in A. Zuckerman and P. Roberts, Criminal Evidence (Oxford: OUP, 2nd ed,
2010) 547-563; I. H. Dennis, ‘Instrumental Protection, Human Right or Functional Necessity:
Reassessing the Privilege against Self-Incrimination’ (1995) 54 CLJ 342; S. Easton, The Case for
the Right of Silence (Vermont: Ashgate, 2nd ed, 1998); M. Redmayne, ‘Rethinking the Privilege
against Self-Incrimination’ (2007) 27 OJLS 209; J. Jackson, ‘Re-Conceptualising the Right of
Silence as an Effective Fair Trial Standard’ (2009) 58 ICLQ 835.
105 P. Ferguson, ‘Repercussions of the Cadder Case: the ECHR’s Fair Trial Provisions and Scottish
Criminal Procedure’ [2011] Crim LR 743, 751.
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accused when he or she decides not to cooperate with a criminal investigation,
however, it is difficult to see why it should always prevail over the state’s
interest in obtaining information from suspects when there is evidence linking
them to an offence, provided this is acquired under appropriate conditions
of procedural fairness. Access to a lawyer arguably constitutes one of the
conditions of procedural fairness that should be met before inferences can
be drawn against any refusal by a suspect to answer questions, as the ECtHR
ruled in Murray, but this suggests that access is more properly founded on the
need to obtain advice on how to respond to accusations against one than upon
any a priori need to uphold the privilege against self-incrimination.
The scope of the privilege also affects the kind of access that should be
granted. The ECtHR has struggled to explain why if the privilege is founded
on respect for the accused’s will, it should not be extended to situations where
suspects are required to hand over documents or to submit to the taking of
breath, blood and urine samples and bodily tissues for the purpose of DNA
testing.106 We have seen that the USSCt in Miranda strongly affirmed the
need for the lawyer’s presence during any custodial questioning if the privilege
was to be properly protected. But, arguably, the risk to the suspect’s privilege
against self-incrimination can be triggered when he or she is subjected to any
questioning by a person in authority whether in custody or not, or indeed,
more broadly, to any state action designed to obtain material that may be
incriminating. This would seem to point to the need for a lawyer being present
at every stage where information or material is sought by the state. But this
has not been required by Strasbourg.
Other jurisdictions which have accepted the principle of early access to a
lawyer have not even endorsed the implication that this requires a lawyer’s pres-
ence during a suspect’s questioning at any stage. In its interpretation of section
10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms which states that upon
arrest or detention, a person has a right to ‘retain and instruct counsel without
delay’, the majority of the Canadian Supreme Court in R v Sinclair107 consid-
ered that the purpose is to provide the detainee with an opportunity to obtain
legal advice relevant to his legal situation and in the context of a custodial
interrogation. Chief among the rights that must be understood by the detainee
is the right under section 7 of the Charter to choose whether to cooperate with
the police or not. The legal advice that this entailed required that the detainee
be told of the right of silence and how to exercise the right in the situation in
which the detainee was placed but, importantly, the court did not consider that
this went so far as advising the detainee on how to deal with police questions.108
The purpose of the right was informational rather than protective. This meant
a right to consult counsel to obtain information and advice immediately upon
detention but it did not entail extending this to providing ongoing legal assis-
tance during the course of the interview, regardless of the circumstances, and
did not entail any right to have counsel present during the interview. It was
106 See J. D. Jackson and S. J. Summers, The Internationalisation of Criminal Evidence (Cambridge:
CUP, 2012) 268-270. cf Redmayne, n 104 above.
107 [2010] SCC 35, SCR 310 at [24].
108 ibid at [31].
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accepted that there could be a second consultation but only where there was a
material change in the detainee’s situation after the initial consultation.
One of the minority Justices in Sinclair considered that in order to give
advice on how to exercise the right of silence, there was a need for the lawyer
to be aware in at least a general way of the unfolding case being put to his client
and this meant that the detainee should be given reasonable access to legal
advice from time to time in the course of police interrogation.109 The other
minority Justices went further and took the view that the detainee should have
unfettered access to his lawyer during interrogation because the purpose of sec-
tion 10 was not merely to advise the client on the exercise of the right of silence
but to protect the detainee’s exercise of the right. But even the dissentients
did not consider that this necessarily entailed the presence of counsel during
interview.110
There is clear language in the judgment of the Grand Chamber in Salduz
that the purpose of access to a lawyer extends to protecting the exercise of the
privilege against self-incrimination. The ECtHR emphasised the particularly
vulnerable position of the accused at the investigation stage and stressed that
the vulnerability of the accused can only be compensated by the assistance
of a lawyer whose task it is, among other things, to help ensure respect
for the right of an accused not to incriminate himself.111 This emphasis on
respecting the right against self-incrimination suggests that the lawyer has a
role to ensure the right is enjoyed and not merely properly understood and
the reference to ensuring that evidence is not obtained through methods of
coercion or oppression underlines this protective role. This is reflected in
later jurisprudence where the ECtHR emphasised the importance of legal
assistance being available ‘when’ an applicant is being questioned.112 It has
now been put beyond doubt that legal assistance requires the presence of a
defence lawyer during custodial questioning.113
Although this would seem to be a clear affirmation of the protective
role that lawyers should play in the police station, there are also signs in
the jurisprudence that the ECtHR envisages lawyers playing a broader role
than simply one of protecting the accused’s rights. In Salduz itself the court
referred to the importance of preventing miscarriages of justice and fulfilling
the aims of Article 6, notably the equality of arms between investigating or
prosecuting authorities and the accused.114 The court went on to underline
the importance of the investigation stage for the preparation of the criminal
proceedings, as the evidence obtained during this stage determines the
framework in which the offence charged will be considered at trial.115 At the
same time, it said, an accused often finds himself in a particularly vulnerable
position at this stage which is amplified by the fact that legislation on criminal
procedure tends to become increasingly complex, notably with respect to rules
109 ibid at [76]-[122] per Binnie J.
110 ibid at [123]-[226] per Lebel and Fish JJ.
111 n 1 above at [54].
112 See, for example, Panovits v Cyprus n 2 above at [66], Brusco v France n 2 above at [54].
113 See, for example, Mader v Croatia ECtHR 21 June 2011, Sebalj v Croatia ECtHR 21 June 2011.
114 (2009) 49 EHRR 421 at [53].
115 ibid at [54].
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governing the gathering and use of evidence.116 Here, the court appears to be
emphasising not only the protective role that the lawyer can play in ensuring
that detained persons are not coerced into making confessions but also the
more representational role that is required in advising on the complexities of
the case against the accused and gathering and using evidence.
This role is emphasised particularly in the concurring opinions of Judges
Zagrebelsky and Bratza who would have preferred the ECtHR to have held
that detained persons should be entitled to access to legal assistance not just
from the point of interrogation but as soon as they are imprisoned so that
from that stage they can give their lawyer instructions in order to prepare their
defence. This broader role is one that was explicitly endorsed in Dayanan v
Turkey117 where the applicant complained that he had had no legal assistance
while he was in police custody. The government argued that because the
applicant had exercised his right of silence under questioning in police custody,
the absence of a lawyer had in no way affected the observance of his defence
rights. In response to this argument the ECtHR declared that a suspect should
be granted access to legal assistance from the moment he is taken into custody
or pre-trial detention, adding that:
the fairness of proceedings requires that an accused be able to obtain the whole
range of services specifically associated with legal assistance. In this regard, counsel
has to be able to secure without restriction the fundamental aspects of that person’s
defence: discussion of the case, organisation of the defence, collection of evidence
favourable to the accused, preparation for questioning, support of an accused in
distress and checking of the conditions of detention.118
Although this passage sets out a broader vision of the defence role, there has
been little subsequent Strasbourg jurisprudence fleshing out its implications.
The issues that have come before the ECtHR have tended to focus upon the
refusal to grant any meaningful access to a lawyer in direct breach of the Salduz
principle rather than upon the particular role that the lawyer has been able to
play once access is granted.119 National courts have in turn been remarkably
cautious about promoting any active role of the kind envisaged in Dayanan.
There would seem to be two reasons for this. First of all, national courts have
traditionally stuck to the letter of the Strasbourg jurisprudence. We have seen
that the ECtHR did not at first specify that the access that should be provided
as from the first interrogation of a suspect by the police required the presence
of a lawyer during the interrogation. In its ruling in a case where a minor in
police custody had made statements without the assistance of a lawyer which
were used in evidence against him, the Dutch Supreme Court held that neither
Salduz nor Panovits v Turkey (a case involving a minor) implied a general right
116 ibid.
117 n 2 above.
118 ibid at [32].
119 See, however, Aras v Turkey (no 2) ECtHR 18 Nov 2014, holding that the purely ‘passive
presence’ of a lawyer in the hearing room during the questioning of the applicant with no
possibility to consult the applicant or to intervene to ensure respect for the applicant’s rights did
not satisfy the Salduz requirement of access to a lawyer.
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to have a lawyer present during the interrogation, although it accepted that
minors were an exception.120 The court only recently ruled that lawyers have
the right to be present in all cases, as of 1March 2016.121 By the time the French
Cour de cassation came to give its rulings, the ECtHR had already ruled in Brusco
v France that a person subjected to a garde a` vue ‘has the right to be assisted by a
lawyer from the beginning of this measure as well during questioning’ and the
judgments reflected the requirement that the suspect must not be questioned
in the absence of his lawyer. We have seen that the Irish Supreme Court drew
on other jurisprudence to elicit the principle that questioning should not
proceed after a suspect has requested a lawyer but it was cautious about going
beyond the facts of the cases before it to find a right to be present during
questioning. The court rejected a separate appeal based on a claim that where
a person is in custody and has requested a solicitor, the police were obliged not
to take any forensic samples until such time as legal advice has been received.
Although the court considered that under Irish constitutional law it might be
different where the suspect has genuine legal choices available in respect of the
taking of samples, in this case the suspect had no legal choice other than to
comply and the court’s treatment of the issue was limited to a consideration of
whether the taking of objective forensic samples without the benefit of legal
advice amounted to a breach of the right against self-incrimination. The court
said not.
Even domestic courts such as the UKSCt, which have appeared favourably
inclined towards accepting the Salduz principle have done so on the basis that
there is ‘clear and constant’ Strasbourg jurisprudence for it and have considered
that it is outside their remit to develop the principle further than Strasbourg
has gone.122 This approach was summed up in the dictum of Lord Bingham
in R (Ullah) v Special Adjudicator,123 that the duty of national courts is to keep
pace with the Strasbourg jurisprudence as it evolves over time: ‘no more, but
certainly no less’, which was later given a ‘characteristically stylish twist’ by Lord
Brown in R (Al-Skeini and others) v Secretary of State for Defence124 where he said
that the sentence could ‘as well have ended: no less, but certainly no more’.
This cautious approach is reflected in later post-Cadder jurisprudence.125
Thus in Ambrose v Harris126 (Ambrose) the accused was questioned at the
120 HR, 30 June 2009, LJN BH3084. See Brants, n 45 above. A number of jurisdictions now
accept that the right to legal assistance for juvenile suspects includes the right to have a lawyer
present during the interrogation. See M. Panzavolta, D. De Vocht, M. van Oosterhout and
M. Vanderhallen (eds), Interrogating Young Suspects: Procedural Safeguards from a Legal Perspective
(Antwerp: Intersentia, 2015).
121 HR, 22 Dec 2015, NJ 2016/52.
122 According to Lord Hope in Cadder, n 86 above at [47], the Strasbourg case law showed that
Salduz had been followed repeatedly in subsequent cases. Although they did not need to rule
upon the question, the Justices in Cadder did not venture an opinion on whether a solicitor
needed to be present throughout the interview and the emergency legislation that was passed in
Scotland in response to Cadder failed to make it clear whether this was required.
123 [2004] 2 AC 323 at [20].
124 [2008] 1 AC 153 at [106]. Lord Kerr described this as a ‘characteristically stylish twist’ in Ambrose
v Harris (Procurator Fiscal) [2011] 1 WLR 2435 at [126].
125 See R. M. White and P. Ferguson, ‘Sins of the Father: The “Sons of Cadder”’ [2012] Crim LR
357.
126 [2011] 1 WLR 2435.
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roadside by police and, although cautioned that he need not reply to questions,
made admissions without legal advice about driving when he was under the
influence of alcohol. The majority judgment engaged in an extensive review of
the Strasbourg authorities to reach the conclusion that it would be to go further
than Strasbourg had gone to hold that his right of access had been breached.
In the majority’s view, the ECtHR had not said, or at least had not said with
sufficient clarity, that a person who has become a suspect and is not in custody
must as a rule have access to a lawyer.127 The same kind of reasoning was used
in McGowan v B128 to reject the argument that any valid waiver of the Salduz
right required the suspect first to receive legal advice before deciding whether
to exercise the right. According to the Justices, there was no rule to this effect
that had been identified by the Strasbourg court. The task of the court was
primarily by examination of Strasbourg jurisprudence to identify as best it
could the requirements which the Strasbourg Court had set for waivers to be
effective.129
Apart from a natural reluctance to go beyond a ‘clear and constant’
jurisprudence from Strasbourg in developing the Salduz principle, it would
seem that there has also been no inclination on the part of national courts and
legislatures to extend the principle beyond the rationale of self-incrimination
that was used to justify the original Salduz decision. In Ambrose heavy reliance
was placed - as it was in Cadder - on the principle against self-incrimination as
the rationale for the exercise of the right of access to a lawyer. But this time it
was used to narrow the scope of the Salduz principle. Although we have seen
that the privilege against self-incrimination might be considered at risk in any
situation where a suspect is subjected to questioning by a person in authority,
the majority judgments considered that the ‘paradigm’ case where a suspect
was at risk of a forced confession was when he was in custody or when his
freedom of action has been significantly curtailed.130 The decision to confine
access to when a suspect might be most at risk of making a coerced confession
betrays a narrow application of the privilege against self-incrimination in its
own terms and a distinct aversion towards contemplating some of the broader
rationales for the principle of access which led the ECtHR to contemplate a
wider role for lawyers than simply protecting the privilege.
When one reviews the various national laws and provisions that have been
introduced by member states in the aftermath of Salduz and the decisions
of national courts, they by and large accede to the principle of early lawyer
access and presence during police questioning but stop short of envisaging any
active role for lawyers. Thus in France and Belgium lawyers are restricted to
exercising a passive non-adversarial role during questioning, which prohibits
them from asking questions or entering into discussions with the police during
the interview.131 In a decision given on 18 November 2011 the French Conseil
127 ibid at [64] per Lord Hope. See also at [82] per Lord Brown and at [95] per Lord Dyson.
128 [2011] 1 WLR 3121.
129 ibid at [5] per Lord Hope, at [78] per Lord Hamilton.
130 n 126 above at [57] per Lord Hope.
131 See the French CCP, Art 63-4-3 inserted by the Law of April 2011 Art 8 and in Belgium
Circulaire n 8/2011 du College des procureurs ge´ne´raux pre`s les Cours d’appel, 23 Nov 2011,
at 52.
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constitutionnel specifically held that the Law of April 14th did not require that
lawyers should be given access to the case file or be able to enter into any
de´bat contradictoire during the garde a` vue.132 A bill currently pending before the
Dutch Parliament finally makes provision for the presence of lawyers during
police questioning in The Netherlands but lawyers are restricted to a passive,
non-adversarial role limiting any questions from the lawyer to the beginning
and end of the police interview.133 Common law jurisdictions have been
less prescriptive but here also there is no expectation that lawyers will play
an active adversarial role. The lawyer’s role in the police station in Scotland
and Ireland has yet to bed down. In England and Wales, where the right of
access has been in existence for many years since the enactment of PACE
in 1984, the Code of Practice permits lawyers in an interrogation, to ‘seek
clarification, challenge an improper question to their client or the manner in
which it is put, advise their client not to reply to particular questions or if
they wish to give their client further legal advice’.134 But this falls short of
giving lawyers any full-blooded adversarial role that is reserved for the trial
process. Lawyers generally have no right to participate in an investigation, no
right to be present at police interviews of witnesses and very limited disclosure
of the case against their client.135 Their role is summed up in the Code as
one of ‘only’ protecting and advancing the legal rights of their client.136 Even
in the US which has the reputation of facilitating the most aggressive kind
of active defence participation at trial, the role of lawyers when suspects are
to be questioned is confined to advising them on their Miranda rights rather
than engaging in any active manner with the case that is put against their
clients.137
We can conclude from this that although both traditions have come to
accept the principle of early lawyer access, albeit in the case of some countries
immersed in the inquisitorial tradition with extreme reluctance, neither
tradition has accepted the idea that an active defence should be conducted
at the stage of police investigation. Both traditions have considered that
the trigger for active defence participation is more properly activated after the
police investigation when the case is ready for ‘adversarial’ argument. In the
adversarial model this stage does not begin until formal charges are brought
and court proceedings are under way. In the inquisitorial model it only begins
when the investigating judge or prosecutor becomes active in the case. In a
recent study carried out across both traditions in England, Scotland, France
132 De´cision 2011-191/194/195/196/197-QPC of 18 Nov 2011. See Giannoulopoulos, n 4 above,
324, Blackstock et al, n 6 above, 91.
133 See C. Brants, ‘What Limits to Harmonising Justice?’ in Colson and Field, n 8 above.
134 Home Office, Revised Code of Practice for the Detention, Treatment and Questioning of Persons by
Police Officers; Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) – Code C, Note 6D, May 2014.
135 The Code has recently been amended to provide that persons interviewed be given sufficient
information to enable them to understand the nature of the suspected offence and why they are
suspected of committing it in line with EU Directive 2012/13/EU on the right to information
in criminal proceedings, OJ L 142/1. See E. Cape, ‘Transposing the EU Directive on the Right
to Information: A Firecracker or a Damp Squib?’ [2015] Crim LR 48.
136 PACE Code C, n 134 above, Note 6D.
137 See Van Kessel, n 41 above, 837-838.
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and The Netherlands, lawyers most commonly characterised their role in the
police station as ensuring that procedures were followed and that suspects were
properly treated.138 Although there were variations across countries in the
degree to which lawyers were prepared to engage in a more active defence
role, with the spectrum of practices varying according to how ‘adversarial’ or
‘inquisitorial’ their criminal justice systems are, it was rare for lawyers in any
system to perform the whole range of functions associated with legal assistance
identified by the ECtHR in Dayanan v Turkey.
It is true that the EU Directive on Access to a Lawyer, which is due now
to be implemented in a number of member states, does appear to contemplate
a somewhat more active role for lawyers in the police station than simply
passive attendance.139 The Directive spells out certain aspects of the lawyer’s
role in more detail than the Strasbourg jurisprudence. For instance, instead of
simply stating, as Salduz did, that suspects shall have access to a lawyer ‘from
the first interrogation’, the Directive states in clear terms that this includes a
right to ‘meet in private and communicate with the lawyer representing them,
including prior to questioning by the police’.140 In a recent decision the court
took account of this provision in confirming that access to a lawyer includes a
right to consult with that lawyer privately before any questioning takes place.141
The use of EU law can help the ECtHR rely upon a progressive interpretation
of the ECHR to advance its vision of an active role for the defence.142
However, there are limits to the extent to which signatories of the Directive
were prepared to advance this vision. For example, the Directive states that
member states should ensure that suspects or accused persons have the right
for their lawyer to ‘be present and participate effectively when questioned’.143
But it then goes on to provide that such participation ‘shall be in accordance
with procedures in national law’, adding somewhat ambiguously ‘provided
such procedures do not prejudice the effective exercise and essence of the right
concerned’.144 The original proposal of the European Commission was much
less ambiguous, envisaging that the lawyer would play an active role during
police questioning with a ‘right to ask questions, request clarification and make
statements’.145
138 Blackstock et al, n 6 above, 337. See also J. Hodgson, ‘From the Domestic to the European:
an empirical approach to comparative custodial legal advice’ in J. Ross and S. Thaman (eds),
Research Handbook on Comparative Criminal Procedure (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2015).
139 n 8 above.
140 ibid, Art 3(3)(a).
141 AT v Luxembourg ECtHR 9 April 2015.
142 See also Zachar and Cˇierny v Slovakia ECtHR 21 July 2015, where the ECtHR acknowledged
the relevance of the EU Directives on the Right to Information and on the Right to Access to
a Lawyer before ruling that the applicants who were told they were suspected of trafficking in
drugs should have been informed of the more serious aggravated offences hanging over them
before they agreed to waive their right of access to a lawyer.
143 n 8 above, Art 3(3)(b).
144 ibid.
145 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and Council on the right of access to a
lawyer in criminal proceedings and on the right to communicate upon arrest, Brussels, 8.6.2011
COM (2011) 326, art 4.
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CONCLUSION: TOWARDS AN ACTIVE DEFENCE AT
THE INVESTIGATION STAGE?
Much has been said about the dialogic relationship between the ECtHR and
national courts.146 The Salduz experience suggests that the ECtHR can win
acceptance for its approach when there is a ‘clear and constant’ jurisprudence
to support it and it is able to appeal to principles that cohere with procedural
traditions. The principle of access to a lawyer prior to and during police
questioning of suspects has been the subject of clear and constant jurisprudence
and has been accepted by national courts because it has been able to appeal
to the need to respect the well-established privilege against self-incrimination.
However, the principle has not been applied by national courts as expansively
as the ECtHR has envisaged and this suggests that there are certain limits to the
cosmopolitan jurisprudence of the Strasbourg court so far as national courts
are concerned. In particular, we have seen that there has been a reluctance to
go beyond any clear and constant jurisprudence emanating from Strasbourg
and to develop the jurisprudence beyond the boundaries set by domestic
law.
This cautious attitude towards the Strasbourg jurisprudence can be chal-
lenged. It is true that the role of the ECtHR differs from that of national courts.
The ECtHR’s primary role is not to defer to procedural tradition but to set
out principles that it believes are required under the Convention, recognising
however that the Convention is built upon values that are widely shared across
the procedural traditions and indeed underlie these traditions. The national
courts for their part should not have to defer to the Strasbourg principles where
they are perceived to deviate too far from procedural tradition.147 But where
the principles that are developed are underpinned by shared values, national
courts should strive to integrate them as far as possible within their procedural
tradition. Instead of seeing ‘Strasbourg’ principles as ‘belonging’ to Strasbourg
and unable to extend to situations which have not yet been considered by
Strasbourg, this would seem to require that where possible they should be
interpreted as domestic principles to be developed in line with the way
principles emanating from within domestic procedural traditions are applied.
Irrespective, then, of the extent to which national courts are bound to apply
the ECtHR’s jurisprudence as a matter of national law, this jurisprudence
should not be seen as ‘foreign’ to the procedural tradition of member
states.
146 See, for example, Dialogue between Judges (Strasbourg: European Court of Human Rights,
2012); Lord Kerr, ‘The Conversation between Strasbourg and National Courts – Di-
alogue or Dictation?’ (2009) 44 Irish Jurist 1; ‘The UK Supreme Court – The
Modest Underworker of Strasbourg?’ Clifford Chance Lecture 25 January 2012 at
https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech_120125.pdf (last accessed 25 May 2016).
147 See, for example, the UKSCt’s rejection of the confrontation principle developed by Strasbourg
in R v Horncastle [2009] 2 AC 373 at [107], Lord Phillips emphasising that the jurisprudence
of the ECtHR in relation to ECHR, Art 6(3)(d) developed largely in cases relating to civil law
rather than common law jurisdictions without full consideration of the safeguards against an
unfair trial that existed under common law procedure. See Jackson and Summers, n 103 above.
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It has been suggested in the UK context that there has been a tendency for
Convention rights to be interpreted as a discrete body of domestic law derived
from the judgments of the ECtHR rather than as a basis for the development
of domestic law when it fails to meet the standards applied.148 If, however,
principles developed by the Strasbourg court are accepted as rooted in domestic
tradition, then they can be regarded as already domesticated and it can be
argued that national courts should develop them in this spirit. This would
appear to be the position of Lord Kerr, the dissenting judge in the UKSCt
decisions of Ambrose and McGowan mentioned above, when he said that the
domestic court could not simply wait until Strasbourg had pointed the way.
The domestic court had a duty not only to ascertain where the jurisprudence
of the Strasbourg court clearly shows that it currently stands but to resolve the
question of whether the claim to a Convention right is viable or not, even
where the Strasbourg jurisprudence has not yet disclosed a clear view:149
If the much vaunted dialogue between national courts and Strasbourg is to
mean anything, we should surely not feel inhibited from saying what we believe
Strasbourg ought to find in relation to those arguments.150
We have seen that the ECtHR has underpinned the Salduz principle by
reference to the need to respect a number of principles that are shared across
different procedural traditions, not just the privilege against self-incrimination
but, in addition, the need to avoid miscarriages of justice and respect the
equality of arms. The approach of national courts should then be to develop the
principle of access to a lawyer not just as an ‘add on’ to domestic tradition but
as contributing to its core aims as well as the aims of Article 6 of the ECHR.
This is the way that the minority judges in Sinclair approached the equivalent
right of access to a lawyer in Canada under section 10(b) of the Charter. The
dissentients agreed with the majority view that the ‘over-arching purpose’ of
the right to counsel lay in the protection against compelled self-incrimination
which in turn preserved ‘fairness’ in the investigative process but considered
that the role of counsel in the administration of justice and under section
10(b) of the Charter was ‘much broader’.151 Their view was shaped by what
they saw as the role of counsel within the justice system generally – to ensure
the proper administration of justice by giving effective assistance during the
all important pre-charge phases when what occurs will likely influence the
nature of the proceedings that follow.152 This reflects the view that the Charter
right under section 10(b) is not some ‘add on’ to existing rights but is firmly
embedded in the ‘right granted to every accused by the common law, the
148 Lord Reed, ‘Human Rights and Domestic Legal Traditions’ in R. G. Anderson, J. Chalmers
and J. MacLeod (eds), Glasgow Tercentenary Essays: 300 Years of the School of Law (Edinburgh:
Avizandum, 2014) 164, 174.
149 n 126 above at [129].
150 ibid at [130].
151 n 107 above at [161].
152 ibid at [161]-[165].
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Criminal Code and sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter to be given the effective
assistance of counsel . . . as a principle of fundamental justice’.153
The Salduz principle should arguably be developed in a similar way by na-
tional courts.We have seen that there would appear to be a reluctance to develop
the principle specifically in the direction of giving lawyers a more active role in
assisting suspects under investigation. But as we have seen whenwe reviewed the
introduction of defence counsel into the trial phase, traditions themselves evolve
to meet the demands of truth finding and fairness as circumstances change. Just
as the introduction of prosecutors in the criminal trial led to a need for a de-
fence role to counter-balance that of the prosecution in order to secure a just
outcome, so the dominance of the police in the investigation phase arguably
requires an active defence at this stage as well when the product of investigation
crucially affects the outcome of the proceedings. In his dissenting judgment in
Ambrose Lord Kerr pursued an openly teleological approach towards the Salduz
right by asking what its purpose was. His Lordship agreed with the respon-
dent’s argument that the right should not be viewed solely as a measure for the
protection of the individual’s interests.154 It was in the interests of society as a
whole that those whose guilt or innocence may be determined by reference to
admissions made in moments of vulnerability are sufficiently protected so as to
sustain confidence in the reliability of those confessions. More broadly, Lord
Kerr drew from Strasbourg jurisprudence the general conclusion that where
an aspect of the proceedings which may be crucial to their outcome is taking
place, there is a need for an effective defence by a lawyer.155 The investigation
stage was important because the evidence obtained at that stage determines the
framework in which the offence charged will be considered at trial and because
it was at that very time when the accused himself is in a vulnerable position.
Lord Kerr did not equate vulnerability here simply with being in custody:
He is vulnerable because at this investigation stage, evidence which may be
instrumental in securing a finding of guilt against him is being obtained and
collated. The way that he reacts during the collection of that evidence may prove
to be of critical importance in his subsequent trial.156
It was not the place at which admissions are made nor whether the individual
making the statement is in detention that was important but the use to which
such statements may subsequently be put at trial.157
As in the Sinclair minority judgments, we see here the beginnings of the
development of a role for counsel which can be equated to their role at trial,
not just to protect the accused’s personal interest but to ensure that an effective
defence is put in the interests of the administration of justice as a whole. The
need for an effective defence may have been traditionally established only at
trial, but as criminal procedure has developed to include what the minority in
153 ibid at [168] (emphasis in original).
154 n 126 above at [132].
155 ibid at [135].
156 ibid at [137] (emphasis in original).
157 ibid at [138].
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Sinclair referred to as ‘skilled and persistent’ interrogation at the investigation
stage where an accused’s response to police questions may have critical conse-
quences for the trial, fairness dictates that he or she needs a lawyer to advise on
the legal issues that bear directly on the defence much in the way that a lawyer
would advise an accused before evidence is given in court.158 The need to
provide an effective defence at the stage of police questioning provides a better
justification for the lawyer’s presence than any need to protect the suspect’s
right against self-incrimination. We have seen that suspects can be protected
against any compelled incrimination by other means. In so far as the privilege
protects suspects from speaking at all, it can be argued that silence is only one
of many options which need to be considered in deciding how to respond to
police questioning and the lawyer’s presence is required to advise on the full
range of options in the light of the consequences that may attach in subsequent
criminal proceedings to the suspect’s attitude during questioning. The suspect’s
understanding of the ways in which the absence of a lawyer at the stage of police
questioningmight have an impact on the viability of his defence should similarly
govern what constitutes an effective waiver of the right of access rather than
simply any need to protect the suspect from coercion of his will.159 Whether
suspects should have a right of access to a lawyer at other evidence-gathering
events during the investigation would seem to depend on whether suspects
have legal choices to make at these events which may bear on their defence.
There is, however, a further respect in which a lawyer may be needed to
play an active role in the investigation phase. The ECtHR in Salduz signalled
the important impact which this phase may have for the trial but the reality
is that increasing numbers of cases in many jurisdictions do not reach trial at
all. As legal systems across the procedural traditions have come to embrace
notions of managerialism,160 there have been moves to try to dispose of cases
in the early stages of proceedings, well before they reach trial. Increasingly
in common law jurisdictions, incentives are being given to suspects to admit
their guilt promptly. In order to secure the full sentence discount in England
and Wales, a defendant has to plead guilty at the ‘first reasonable opportunity’,
which can encompass statements made in the police station.161 Increasing
numbers of cases are also diverted away from the court through the use of
cautions which are an alternative to prosecution in return for an admission
of guilt and which form part of a defendant’s criminal record.162 A system
of conditional cautions has also been put in place under which prosecutors
agree not to prosecute persons who have admitted guilt and are prepared to
158 This would seem to equate to the ‘critical stage’ test that the USSCt has used to determine
when the right to counsel is triggered in US law. See Coleman v Alabama (1970) 399 US 1. I am
indebted to Ma´ximo Langer for drawing my attention to this.
159 See also Lord Kerr’s dissenting judgment in McGovern v B [2011] 1 WLR 3121 at [108].
160 See, for example, J. McEwan, ‘From Adversarialism to Managerialism: criminal justice in tran-
sition’ (2011) 31 Legal Studies 519; R. Colson and S. Field, The Transformation of Criminal Justice:
Comparing France with England and Wales (Paris: L’Harmattan, Bibliothe`ques de droit, 2011).
161 See Sentencing Guidelines Council, Reduction in Sentence for a Guilty Plea (2004).
162 See Ministry of Justice, Simple Cautions for Adult Offenders (2013). Cautions were replaced for
young defendants by a system of reprimands and final warnings under the Crime and Disorder
Act 1998.
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comply with certain conditions as an alternative to prosecution.163 Civil law
systems have also adopted procedures equivalent to guilty pleas or systems
of informal sanctions.164 The German Code of Criminal Procedure provides
for case resolution whereby the court gives an indication of a more lenient
sentence in exchange for the defendant’s confession.165 France and Italy have
likewise developed equivalents to plea bargaining, known as the comparution sur
reconnaissance pre´alable de culpabilite´ in France and the patteggiamento in Italy.166
The increasing pressure for cases to be disposed of without trial makes the
role of the defence at the investigation phase before the trial all the more impor-
tant. Formal sentence after trial is being replaced by a negotiated sentence or
sanction after investigation, so that the investigation phase effectively becomes
the trial. If the investigatory phase is being transformed in many cases into the
accusatory phase of the trial, then it must follow that the procedural safeguards
that have traditionally been considered necessary for the legitimacy of the trial
need to be frontloaded on to the investigatory phase. The Salduz principle
becomes in consequence not only necessary in order to ensure that the suspect
is advised about his rights and to ensure that they are respected; it also becomes
necessary to ensure compliance with the principles of equality of arms and
adversarial procedure that have traditionally been reserved for the trial phase.
These developments pose a challenge to the procedural traditions of both ad-
versarial and non-adversarial systems. We have seen that in both systems an ac-
tive role for the defence during the investigation stage has been resisted. Adver-
sarial systems consider that there is a role for the defence at the pre-trial stage but
only largely in order to prepare for trial and non-adversarial systems have con-
sidered that the defence role only becomes active when the investigating judge
or prosecutor becomes engaged. The Salduz principle enables suspects to be ad-
vised on their rights during police questioning but active defence participation
at this stage has not been accepted. However, procedural traditions are capable
of adapting to change in response to demands that they live up to underlying
ideals of truth finding and fairness on which their legitimacy has depended.
If criminal procedures are truly undergoing managerial changes that move the
centre of gravity of adjudication from the trial towards the investigation stage,
then the safeguards reserved for trial processes will have to be increasingly as-
signed to suspects at this stage. Such a transition will not be easy to achieve. We
have seen that it took the most part of a century for the procedural traditions to
accept an active role for the defence at trial. One commentator has considered
that the question as to what safeguards can be devised for case resolutions with-
out trial will dominate the procedural battles of the twenty first century.167 But
now there are at least cosmopolitan influences at work which can play a role in
163 See Criminal Justice Act 2003, Pt 3, ss 22-27.
164 S. Thaman, ‘Plea-Bargaining, Negotiated Confessions and Consensual Resolution of Criminal
Cases’ in K. Boele-Woelki and S. van Erp (eds), General Reports of the XVII Congress of the
International Academy of Comparative Law (Brussels/Utrecht: Eleven International, 2007).
165 Germany CCP, s 257(c). See T. Weigend, ‘The Decay of the Inquisitorial Ideal: Plea Bargaining
Invades German Criminal Procedure’ in Jackson at al, n 9 above, 39.
166 See French CPP, Arts 495-7-495-16; Italian CCP, Arts 444-48.
167 T. Weigend, ‘Should We Search for the Truth, andWho Should Do It?’ (2011) 36North Carolina
Journal of International Law & Commercial Regulation 389, 415.
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facilitating change. Supra-national organs such as the ECtHR provide a forum
where arguments can be made and where a positive lead can be taken. The Sal-
duz experience suggests that the ECtHR can influence procedural change not
only in its capacity as the authoritative source of interpretation of Convention
rights but also by acting as a forum for developing standards of fairness which
are also deeply embedded in the procedural traditions of member states.
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